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CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
Anti-Racketeering Legislation in America
"It appears that when the Congress does not seem to have
anything else to do, we must meet here and make some more
crimes."
- Statement of Congressman Young
concerning the 1934 anti-racketeering legislation'
In 1983, President Ronald Reagan emphasized the importance of
federal efforts to curb organized criminal activity, characterizing or-
ganized crime as "a continuing threat to the domestic security of our
nation", and stating that organized crime "take [s] a tremendous toll
on the criminal justice system and its resources."2 To agree that a
national problem of organized crime exists, however, is not necessa-
rily to agree that the government's declarations as to its scope are
accurate or that the methods used in fighting it are appropriate or
effective. Like other social issues, organized crime is addressed to
the extent that it is politically favorable, which is not necessarily an
indicator of how great a threat the problem actually poses. In the
last two decades, the volume and scope of legislation addressing or-
ganized crime has drastically decreased, with the most recent major
legislation put into effect over fifteen years ago. 3 This decrease, how-
ever, may not reflect success in the federal efforts against racketeer-
ing and other forms of organized crime, but simply a realization by
Congress and the executive that other issues hold more political
value.
This article is about the methods of the American government in
fighting organized crime. It traces the history of federal anti-racke-
teering legislation, beginning with Congress's ban on lotteries in the
* James Louis Calamaras, Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington).
This article is a condensed and updated version of Racketeering and the Federaliza-
tion of Crime, 22 Am. Crim. L.R. 213 (1984). My thanks to Laura Jakubowski for her
editorial and research assistance.
1. 78 Cong. Rec., 7967, 8138 (1934) (statement of Rep. Young).
2. Letter from President Reagan to Senator Thurmond (January 26, 1983), re-
printed in Organized Crime in America, Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Organized
Crime in America].
3. Norman Abrams and Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Law and its Enforce-
ment 3d, at 515 (West Group, 2000) (West Publishing Company, 1986).
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late nineteenth century. It follows the development of federal power
through Prohibition, the Kefauver hearings and the Kennedy admin-
istration to the present-a time at which organized crime has been
eclipsed by other threats. The article shows how the Justice Depart-
ment and a compliant Congress have progressively increased the fed-
eral power to combat organized crime despite persistent doubts as to
just what constitutes organized crime, what methods would be most
effective in attacking it, and how useful the methods chosen actually
have been. After a century of federal efforts to eliminate organized
crime, the only certain result is that the federal bureaucracy dedi-
cated to the elimination of the problem has grown exponentially.4 As
for organized crime itself, no one definitively knows what it is or how
extensive its operations may be; consequently, attempting to assess
its growth or diminution is pure speculation5
This article also discusses how the commerce clause has been
eroded into near meaninglessness by the expansion of federal laws
directed at organized crime, demonstrating the power of the organ-
ized crime issue as a political weapon. The growth of federal power in
this area may be regarded as a paradigm for the growth of federal
governmental power in other areas, most recently in the govern-
ment's efforts to protect the country from terrorism. The vitality of an
establishment created to deal with a particular problem depends
upon the continued existence, and even growth, of the problem. The
perception of an ever-growing threat of crime, terrorism, or any other
problem, is the lifeblood of the establishments set up to combat these
problems.
I. THE EARLY LEGISLATION
While organized criminal activity in America is undoubtedly as
old as America itself,6 the notion that the federal government ought
to do anything about it is relatively recent. What might be considered
the first federal organized crime legislation dealt with something
which originally was not only legal but also a vital source of public
revenue in eighteenth and early nineteenth century America - the
4. The FBI has grown from 239 employees in 1925, to 10,291 in 1950, and to
19,738 in 1980. See Federal Budget Hearings for FYs 1927, 1952 and 1982 respec-
tively. On the FBI's 96- year anniversary, in July of 2004, the organization had over
28,000 employees. At www.fbi.gov/fbihistory.htm.
5. Compare 78 CONG. REC. 451(1934) (estimate that organized crime netted $13
billion per year) with Miller, A Federal Viewpoint on Combating Organized Crime,
347 ANNALs 93, 94 (1963) (1961 estimate that organized crime netted $22 billion per
year). In 2004, the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Global Organized
Crime Project estimated that the global profits of organized crime exceeded $1 trillion
per year.
6. See Tyler, An Interdisciplinary Attack on Organized Crime, 347 ANNALs 104,
107 (1963) (early settlers were plagued by pirates who sailed up navigable rivers of
eastern seaboard and plundered plantations and villages).
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lottery. Lotteries enjoyed widespread popularity throughout the first
century of the country's existence and were used frequently by states
and universities to finance worthwhile projects.7 Mismanagement
and dishonesty on the part of the organizers, combined with social
concerns about the lottery's negative effects, however, led to increas-
ing public opposition to lotteries,8 and by 1878 they were illegal in
most states.'9
Despite state regulation and popular opposition elsewhere, the
Louisiana lottery continued to flourish, flouting the laws of the other
states by selling chances through the mails.10 To deal with this prob-
lem, Congress passed a series of laws, ostensibly through its power to
regulate interstate commerce. This legislation began with regulation
of lottery materials sent through the mail, and culminated in a law
which prohibited any person from bringing materials related to the
lottery into the United States, or carrying them from state to state,
by any means.11 In 1899 the Supreme Court affirmed Congress's
power to regulate in this way, upholding the conviction of C.F. Cham-
pion for conspiracy to deposit a batch of lottery tickets for interstate
shipment. 12 The majority opinion in Champion v. Ames is laced with
the same moralistic view of lotteries which had influenced Congress,
concluding that "we should hesitate long before adjudging that an
evil of such appalling character, carried on through interstate com-
merce, cannot be met and crushed by the only power competent to
that end, Congress."13
Two aspects of this opinion are noteworthy. First, this decision
was the first to recognize federal power under the Commerce Clause
for the purpose of promoting public morals, which created a new fed-
eral police power that was the basis for future legislation aimed at
organized criminal activity. Still, as broad as Champion was, it was
limited to actual interstate (or international) shipment of materials.
Second, the fundamental assumption upon which the legislation
and the Supreme Court decision were based - that Congress was
"the only power competent" 14 to deal with the problem - was cer-
tainly erroneous. It was not the inability of the states to act but their
unwillingness, for whatever reasons, which led to the federal action
to eradicate what was perceived by the federal authorities as a moral
7. J. EZELL, FORTUNE'S MERRY WHEEL, THE LOTTERY IN AMERICA 64, 71 (1960).
8. Id. at 107; Id. at 205.
9. Id. at 249; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879). (Mississippi's ban on
lotteries upheld as exercise of police power).
10. J. EZELL supra note 6, at 247-49. See also Alwes, The History of the Louisiana
Lottery Company, 27 LA. HIST. Q. 964, 973-74 (1944).
11. Act of March 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 85, 28 Stat. 963 (1895) [codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1301 (1948)].
12. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
13. Id. at 357-58.
14. Id. at 357.
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wrong, not as a threat to commerce. This is a theme which will be
constantly repeated in the legislation discussed in this article.
No sooner had the scourge of lotteries been supposedly eradi-
cated by federal legislation than another issue sprang to the forefront
of political and popular attention. It was a significant problem
around the turn of the century that young women, from rural
America and from foreign countries, came to large American cities
and for want of any alternative means of livelihood, turned to a life of
prostitution. There was no question but that these houses of prostitu-
tion existed at the sufferance of the local police.
A combination of xenophobic fear of undesirable aliens,15 Victo-
rian revulsion against the immoral practice of prostitution, and, to a
lesser extent, genuine concern for the welfare of the women' 6 , created
a strong public reaction against prostitution. Congress, along with
the rest of the country, believed that there was "an organized system
or syndicate having for its purpose the importation of women from
foreign countries to. . . the United States for immoral purposes."' 7 In
1875, acting under its power to regulate immigration,18 Congress en-
acted a statute which forbade the "importation into the United States
of women for the purpose of prostitution."' 9 In 1907, Congress went
even further, imposing criminal penalties on any person who kept a
woman for prostitution during the three years after her entrance into
the country.20
After the Supreme Court held the latter statute unconstitutional
as not within the scope of Congress's power to regulate immigra-
tion, 21Congress was forced again to turn to the commerce clause.
Cong. Mann introduced a bill "prohibiting the transportation [in in-
terstate commerce]for immoral purposes of women and girls."2 2 The
House Report accompanying the bill rather clearly indicated that the
interstate travel aspect of the bill was added simply to fit it within
the new federal jurisdiction established by Champion v. Ames rather
than because interstate travel was essential to the offense. 23 Not
only was interstate travel not an essential part of the prostitution
15. See F. CORDASCO, The White Slave Trade and the Immigrants 26 (1981).
16. E.g., The Women's Christian Temperance Union expanded their concerns to
include lobbying for the welfare of these unfortunate women. Id at 3.
17. H.R. REP. No.47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1901) (emphasis added).
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (limiting Congress' power to restrict immigra-
tion prior to year 1808); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289
(1904).
19. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 3, 18 Stat. 477 (1875). This was superseded by
the Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903), which was to the same
effect.
20. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 89 (1907).
21. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 144 (1909).
22. H.R. 12315, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). The bill was enacted June 25, 1910,
ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825-27 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424).
23. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 16, at 4, 6-8.
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business, but the Act was essentially a regulation of the private activ-
ity of individuals, and there was little evidence to suggest that forbid-
ding interstate travel to prostitutes would have the effect of
eliminating prostitution. Thus, as was to become the pattern in later
years, the Act provided federal jurisdiction to demonstrate that Con-
gress was doing something about the problem, even though the prob-
lem was not in fact amenable to solution at the federal level. This
statute represented a further extension of federal power into an area
where federal action was not necessary to effective enforcement, but
was simply desired because the states were not doing the job. The
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the statue in Hoke v. United
States.24
Similarly, with the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, popularly
known as the Dyer Act,25 Congress once again turned to the Com-
merce Clause in order to use the interstate aspect of crime as the
basis for federal jurisdiction. The Dyer Act prohibited the transpor-
tation in interstate or foreign commerce of a motor vehicle by anyone
who knew the same to be stolen.26 The Dyer Act was not aimed at
solving problems of detection or apprehension,27 but rather for the
"purpose of giving some jurisdictional authority to bring witnesses
from one state to another."28 If authority to transport witnesses was
the end sought, a more obvious means to it would have been simply to
promote an interstate compact on witnesses. The Dyer Act did not
break any new ground in the development of the jurisdictional au-
thority of the federal government, but it proved to be vital in the exer-
cise of that authority. Despite the fact that detection and recovery of
stolen vehicles remained overwhelmingly the province of state and
local police, prosecution of those offenses was virtually completely
taken over by the federal government 29 in order to improve FBI con-
viction statistics.
II. PROHIBITION AND REACTION
The wave of moralism that led Congress to outlaw prostitution in
1909 gained momentum in the second decade of the century. The
statutes spawned by this attempt to legislate morality were not
aimed at organized crime, however, but rather at the disorganized
use of narcotic drugs and liquor by the general population. Measures
banning the importation of opium and statutes that by implication
24. 227 U.S. 308(1913).
25. Act of October 29, 1919, ch. 89, 41 Stat. 324 (1919) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2312 (1979)).
26. Id.
27. 58 CONG. REc. 5474 (1919).
28. Id.
29. For example, the FBI Annual Report for 1937-38 reported 5420 convictions.
Of these reported convictions, 2093 were for vehicle theft.
2006] 675
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criminalized narcotics use and distribution created a fertile field for
organized criminal endeavor.30 The National Prohibition (Volstead)
Act added to this problem to an even greater degree.3' Overnight the
legitimate brewing and distilling industry was declared illegal while
demand, piqued because alcohol had become a forbidden fruit, greatly
increased. By necessity, this demand was now met by criminals-ei-
ther the former legitimate producers operating illegally or bands of
gangsters and thugs.
While America had organized crime before prohibition, it was
more diverse, loosely structured, and primarily involved with prosti-
tution, gambling and political corruption on a local level. These activ-
ities did not require large organizations. In contrast, prohibition
created a need for large-scale distribution networks comprising
smugglers, distillers, bottlers, warehouses and trucks as well as nu-
merous retailing outlets Thus, organized crime, as we know it today,
was born-the unwanted child of an unfortunate act of Congress. As
the gangsters gained strength, entire towns were taken over.32 Local
police forces were rendered ineffective by widespread public flouting
of the laws and millions paid in bribes by gangsters, in the face of
which Washington was quiescent.
Immediately prior to the repeal of the Prohibition Act on Decem-
ber 5, 1933,33 crime seemed to run rampant. Cities such as Chicago
and Detroit were in the grip of gangsters, and murders of police and
federal agents, as well as gang figures, were commonplace.34 It got
worse. With the onset of the Depression and the imminent demise of
prohibition, falling liquor profits forced the gang leaders to find other
outlets for the energies of their violent henchmen. Mobsters began to
move into other previously untapped areas such as extortion from le-
gitimate business and labor racketeering.3 5 At the same time, a wave
of kidnapping and bank robberies terrorized the country.36
Obviously, there was political capital to be made from attacking
crime. The first volley fired from Washington was the Federal Kid-
napping Act,37 introduced as a measure aimed at the depredations of
30. R. Bonnie & C. Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge:
An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 Va. L. Rev.
971, 1080 (1970).
31. National Prohibition Act, ch. 83. 41 Stat. 305 (1919). The Act provided for the
manufacture of industrial alcohol by permits, banned the use of beverage alcohol, and
charged the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with enforcement of the Act.
32. H. ABAmNSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME 80-81 (1969) (describes how Capone mob
took over Cicero, IL in 1924).
33. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI.
34. H. ABAnINSKY. supra note 31, at 72, 84.
35. Id. at p. 84.
36. Brabner-Smith, Firearm Regulation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 400 (1934).
37. Federal Kidnapping Act, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) [codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1979)].
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organized crime38 and passed in the furor surrounding the kidnap-
ping of the Lindbergh baby.39 Despite protests from the House Judi-
ciary Committee that the bill was an unnecessary intrusion on the
police authority of the states,40 the Federal Kidnapping Act was en-
acted on June 22, 1932, making interstate transportation of a kid-
napped victim a federal offense subject to life imprisonment.
In the summer and fall of 1933, a subcommittee of the Commerce
Committee held hearings around the country on the subject of organ-
ized crime. With the exception of Assistant Attorney General Kee-
nan, the overwhelming sentiment of the witnesses, federal and state
officials alike, was that crime should be dealt with by state, not fed-
eral authorities.41 However, because deferring to the states meant
that Congress would have nothing to show for the hearing, it is
hardly surprising that despite the opinion of the witnesses, thirteen
major bills were introduced in January of 1934. The important mea-
sures which were enacted expanded the coverage of the Lindbergh
Law,42 forbade interference with interstate commerce by threats,
force or violence,43 extended the Dyer Act to cover interstate trans-
portation of all stolen property worth more than $5,000,44 forbade in-
terstate flight to avoid prosecution or testimony,45 and regulated the
sales and shipment of firearms. 46 Later bills in the same session ad-
ded bank robbery 47 and assault on a federal officer to the list of fed-
eral crimes. 48
38. See, 75 Cong. Rec. 13, 284 (1932) (Remarks of Cong. Cochran).
39. In December, 1931, S. 1525, 75 CONG. REC. 275 (1931), was introduced in the
Senate and H.R. 5657, 75 CONG. REc. 491 (1931), in the House. Finley, The Lindbergh
Law, 28 Geo. L.J. 908, 909-10 (1940). The Lindbergh baby was kidnapped on March 2,
1932. Id. at 910.
40. 75 CONG. REc. 13, 291-92.
41. E.g., George Z. Medalie, United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, testified: "whenever the Federal Government acts, the local authorities
practically abdicate their power. . . . [Tlhe more power you take away from localities,
the less able will be the localities to function." Investigation of So-Called Rackets:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. On Commerce, United States Senate, 73rd
Cong. 2d Sess. 83-84 (1933).
42. S. 2252, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
43. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (originally proposed as S.
2248, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
44. Act of May 22, 1948, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794 (originally proposed as S. 2845, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2314(1976). The primary purpose of
this bill was to bring bank robbery within federal jurisdiction. 78 CONG. REC. at 452
(remarks of Senator Vandenberg).
45. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 302, 48 Stat. 782 (1934) (originally proposed as S.
2253, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976).
46. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (originally proposed as H.R.
9741, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 5841(1976).
47. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, 48 Stat. 783 (1934) (originally proposed as S.
2841, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976).
48. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 299, 48 Stat. 780 (1934) (originally proposed as S.
2080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976).
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Passed for the most part in a flurry of patriotic fervor, the most
striking feature of these bills was simply their volume.49 Two of the
bills, however, contained features which also significantly broadened
the legal basis for federal jurisdiction. All of the earlier legislation
and most of the 1934 acts required actual participation in commerce
- either interstate travel or use of a facility of interstate commerce.
The Anti-Racketeering Act, however, claimed federal jurisdiction
when the crime is "in connection with or in relation to any act in any
way or degree affecting" interstate or foreign commerce.50 A contem-
porary commentator argued that the reason this Act was so broad is
the fact that the activities of racketeers are primarily local.51 The
very fact that racketeering did not have much impact on interstate
commerce led Congress to enact this very broad statute in order to
assert federal jurisdiction.
The second significant extension of federal jurisdictional author-
ity among these bills occurred in the amendment to the Lindbergh
Law which created a rebuttable presumption of interstate travel af-
ter seven days. 52 The purpose of this presumption was to allow the
Division of Investigation (later the FBI) to get into cases before the
"clues [were] cold."5 3 Although the government repeatedly used this
presumption to establish federal investigative jurisdiction, they usu-
ally have not relied on it at trial, turning all non-interstate cases over
to local authorities for prosecution. 54 In 1977, however, the govern-
ment made the mistake of relying on the presumption at trial, and
the court of appeals struck it down as unconstitutional.5 5
III. THE KEFAUVER ERA
In the late 1930's the war on crime appeared to be succeeding,
with the convictions of Al Capone, 56 notorious bank robber Alvin
Karpis,5 7 and the indictment of seventy-three racketeering figures in
1935-36.58 New York authorities also successfully prosecuted, and ex-
49. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME 332 (1934)
(remarks of Assistant Attorney General Keenan). This increase in the number of fed-
eral laws promptly led to a proposal that the size of the FBI must be tripled. Moley,
Report to President Roosevelt, reprinted in N.Y. Times, May 24, 1934, § 1, at 2.
50. Ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (1934); 18 U.S.C. §§ 421-25 (Supp. 1934), as amended, 18
U.S.C. § 2951 (1976) (emphasis added).
51. Note, Racketeering. Bank Robbery and Kickback Laws, 1 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 445, 447 (1934) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
52. 48 Stat. 781(1934).
53. 78 CONG. REC. 453 (1934) (Remarks of Senator Copeland).
54. Bomar, The Lindbergh Law, 1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 435, 443 (1934).
55. United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1978).
56. J. KOBLER, Capone, 341-43 (1971).
57. A. MILLSPAUGH, CRIME CONTROL BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 104-05
(1937).
58. W. MOORE, THE KEFAUVER COMMITTEE AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME 1950-52 17
(1974).
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ecuted, the leading mob figure, Louis "Lepke" Buchalter, along with
other members of the "Murder, Inc." conspiracy.59 Congressional
concern with the crime problem diminished and then disappeared al-
together when World War II took over the headlines.6 0 After the war,
however, the crime issue resurfaced. J. Edgar Hoover released statis-
tics showing a 12.4% increase in crime in 1945 and a further 7.6%
jump the next year.61 It was said that in Chicago the Capone mob
was resurging62 and in New York, Frank Costello rated stories in
Time and Newsweek as the elder statesman of the underworld.63 The
"subtle black stain of a hoodlum super-government" was said to be
spreading over the country.64
In this atmosphere of renewed hysteria over the problem of or-
ganized crime, the government felt compelled to act. An ambitious
junior Senator from Tennessee, Estes Kefauver, introduced Senate
Resolution 20265 on January 5, 1950, to empower his Judiciary Com-
mittee to investigate "interstate gambling and racketeering."66 After
considerable jockeying for position among other representatives and
senators who wanted a piece of the organized crime issue,67 the reso-
lution was approved on May 3, 1950.68 The Kefauver Committee held
hearings around the country in cities such as Detroit, New Orleans
and St. Louis.69 The hearings culminated in March of 1951 with a
nationally televised presentation in New York featuring Frank Cos-
tello. Costello confirmed the public image of the prototypical murder-
ous Italian mobster as he tried to evade the Committee's questions. 70
The impact of the hearings was to convince the public that there was
a "nationwide crime syndicate" which profited greatly from gambling
revenues and maintained its position through "persuasion, intimida-
tion, violence, and murder."71
The Committee also introduced a score of legislative proposals
which sought to cut down the influence of organized crime by limiting
59. A. TuLLY, Treasury Agent (1958) in ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 205 (G.
Tyler, ed. 1962).
60. See CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD INDEX, 1935-1950 (showing virtually no legisla-
tive activity relating to crime).
61. Hoover, The Rising Crime Wave, AM. MAG. 124-28 (Mar. 1946).
62. W. MOORE, supra note 57, at 26.
63. TIME, Oct. 17, 1949, at 27; NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1949, at 33. See also Asbury,
America's Number I Mystery Man, COLLIERS, Apr. 12, 1947 and Apr. 19, 1947.
64. B. Considine, Hoodlum Empire, International News Service, Feb. 13, 1950.
Quoted in 96 Cong. Record 1502 (1950).
65. S. Res. 202, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1950).
66. 96 CONG. REC. 67 (1950).
67. W. MOORE, supra note 57, at 49-63.
68. S. Res. 202, supra note 63.
69. See W. MOORE, supra note 57, at 183.
70. Id. at 189.
71. S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1951) (THE THIRD INTERIM REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE).
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narcoticS7 2 and illegal liquor traffic,7 3 "liberaliz [ing] the process of de-
portation of criminals,"74 and giving the Justice Department the
power to immunize witnesses. 75 The "keystone"76 of the Committee's
proposals was three bills designed to "strike at" and "cripple" organ-
ized crime by barring gamblers from using interstate telegraph facili-
ties.77 Although none of these bills passed,78 the Kefauver
extravaganza seemed to sate the public and congressional appetite
for crime. Only two statutes, the Wagering Tax Act79 and the Nar-
cotic Control Act,80 were passed over the next few years.
After a seven-year hiatus, public interest in organized crime was
restimulated in November of 1957 when New York State Police ar-
rested sixty-three organized crime figures from across the nation.8 '
Shortly thereafter, the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activi-
ties in the Labor and Management Field (McClellan Committee) held
hearings that exposed the corruption of many unions, especially the
Teamsters, and their close connection with organized crime.82 In the
Justice Department, Attorney General Rogers reported "substantial
and continuing success" against organized crime.88 He predicted the
continued decline of organized crime, noting that "[The federal gov-
ernment has a number of powerful weapons that it can use in this
72. S. 1695, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (increased penalties for certain narcotics
violations) and S. 1900, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (same). See S. REP. No. 725, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1951) (THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE
ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE) [hereinafter cited as THE FINAL REPORT
OF THE KEFAUVER COMM.].
73. S. 1530, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (designed to make it more difficult to im-
port bootleg liquor into dry states), S. 1663, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (same), and S.
2062, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (same). See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE KEFAUVER
COMM., supra note 69, at 91.
74. S. Rep. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1951) (THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE) [hereinaf-
ter cited as THE FINAL REPORT OF THE KEFAUVER COMM.]. The Committee had found
that "a number of important criminals... had entered the United States illegally." Id.
75. S. 1747, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE KEFAUVER
Comm., supra note 73, at 94.
76. 97 CONG. REc. 12968 (1951) (remarks of Senator O'Conor).
77. S. J. Res. 65, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951). See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
KEFAUVER COMM. supra note 74, at 96.
78. 97 CONG. REC. 12968, 6640, 8807, 5664, 6457, 10680, 5664, 7015 (1950).
79. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 183, §§ 463, 471, 65 Stat. 452 (1951). This
statute was struck down by the Supreme Court in Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39, 60 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 71 (1968).
80. Narcotic Control Act of 1956, ch. 629, § 7237, 70 Stat. 568 (1956), as amended,
26 U.S.C. § 7237 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 174, 176a, 184a (1956). For a full discussion of the
history of federal narcotics legislation, see Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 29.
81. H. ABADINSKY, supra note 31, at 11.
82. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1958) (FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE
SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD). E.g., "The
Committee finds that the New York garbage-collecting industry has been infiltrated
and dominated by criminals including the Mafia." Id. at 327.
83. Rogers, The New War on Organized Crime. PARADE MAGAZINE, Feb. 7, 1960,
quoted in 106 CONG. REC. 2159 (1960).
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battle against syndicated crime. And today the criminal is faced by a
formidable alliance of State and Federal officers."84
IV. THE ERA OF ACTIVISM
Yet one year later, to hear new Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy tell it, this "formidable alliance" had abandoned the field in dis-
array. Kennedy claimed that "the situation is worse than it was 10
years ago in terms of the financial power of the racketeers, the extent
of their operations, the number of people involved and their political
power."85 Kennedy proposed several federal statutes.86 These propos-
als prohibited interstate travel in aid of racketeering (ITAR),87 ex-
panded the fugitive felon law to cover all felonies,88 forbade the use of
interstate communication facilities for gambling purposes,89 prohib-
ited interstate shipment of materials and machines used in gam-
bling,90 expanded the immunity statute to apply to labor
investigations, 91 and offered expanded protection to witnesses during
the investigatory stage of the criminal process.92 All of these were
enacted, except the immunity and witness protection proposals, al-
beit in slightly less ambitious forms than originally proposed. Ken-
nedy promised that denying the use of the nation's communications
system to gamblers, which the proposed legislation would supposedly
accomplish, "would be a mortal blow to their operations."93
ITAR, which Kennedy termed "the most controversial of the
bills,"94 was the most significant both in terms of expansion of federal
jurisdiction and subsequent use by the government as a prosecutorial
tool. As usual, the explanations of the need for the statute-to fill "a
hole in the criminal laws of the United States,"95-were spurious. In
the first place, the problem could be easily addressed by other new,
84. ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAw ENFORCEMENT: REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION
ON ORGANIZED CRIME (M. Ploscow, ed., 1953), 221-22, plus parenthetical comment.
85. Washington Star, Aug. 13, 1961 (speech by Robert Kennedy), reprinted in 107
CONG. REC. 6414 app. (1961).
86. For a detailed but uncritical discussion of these and the other anti-gambling
statutes, see Blakely and Kurkland, The Development of the Federal Law of Gam-
bling, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 923 (1978).
87. Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (1961). Currently 18 U.S. C. § 1952.
88. Pub. L. No. 87-368, 75 Stat. 795 (1961).
89. Pub. L. No. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491 (1961).
90. Pub. L. No. 87-218, 75 Stat. 491 (1961), and Pub. L. No. 87-840, 76 Stat. 1075
(1961).
91. S. 1665, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
92. Id.
93. Washington Star, supra n. 84.
94. Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: The Attorney Gen-
eral's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
95. Legislation Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings before Subcomm. Of the
House Comm. On the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1961) (testimony of Assis-
tant Attorney General Herbert J. Miller).
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gambling specific, legislation that had already been enacted.96 More-
over, had the states really wished to prevent gambling, they could
have done so by their own regulation. They had not done so, of course,
because in their hearts, most citizens at least tolerated such organ-
ized criminal activities.97
Aside from the arguably unnecessary expansion of the federal
government's commerce power, ITAR is an extremely broad statute.98
It is limited to neither travel, racketeering, nor a continuous course of
conduct, and the possibilities are endless for creative federal prosecu-
tion of people who are not "interstate racketeers" by any definition.
Indeed, ITAR has repeatedly been used to prosecute purely local
gambling operations.99 This is not a surprising result from Justice
Department attorneys, who should be expected to push their statu-
tory authority to the limit in order to make their cases.
In the next two years the Attorney General sought even greater
authority from Congress, informing the Senate of the existence of "a
private government of organized crime, a government with an annual
income of billions, resting on a base of human suffering and moral
corrosion. . . Organized crime has grown immensely since the days of
the Kefauver hearings."100 Accordingly, the Justice Department pro-
posed legislation to expand the immunity power 01 and to give the
Department the power to conduct wiretaps in certain particularly se-
rious cases such as kidnapping and murder. 102 In order to drum up
enthusiasm for the bills, the Justice Department, in the autumn of
1963, produced Mafioso Joseph Valachi, who regaled the Committee
with tales of blood rites, murders, and the code of omerta, and added
96. S. 1656, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1961) (prohibiting the use of the telephone
in interstate gambling) and S. 1657, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
97. For example, "an aroused citizenry" cleaned up Beaumont, Texas, a town pre-
viously "controlled" by organized crime. Senate Hearings, supra note 93, at 2.
98. One problem with ITAR is that it arguably interferes with the constitutional
right to travel. See. e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (recognizing right
to travel as fundamental constitutional right).
99. See e.g. United States v. Erlenbaugh, 452 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1967), aff'd on
other grounds, 409 U.S. 239 (1972); United States v. Carpenter, 392 F.2d 205 (6th Cir.
1968) (interstate travel falls under statute even if trips out of state have no connec-
tion to illegal activities).
100. Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigation of the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations. Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-19(1963) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Narcotics
Hearing].
101. Id. at 15 (asking for authority to provide immunity to witnesses in racketeer-
ing investigations).
102. This bill was originally submitted as S. 2813, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962)
(later it became S. 1308, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)). As originally introduced, the
bill forbade wiretapping by private individuals, but allowed it for state and federal
authorities in national security, murder, kidnapping, extortion, bribery, illegal trans-
missions of wagering information, ITAR and narcotics cases. Narcotics Hearings,
supra note 100, at 3. The authority was limited to "interception of wire communica-
tions." Id.
682
ANTI-RACKETEERING LEGISLATION IN AMERICA
La Cosa Nostra to the organized crime lexicon.103 With the assassina-
tion of President Kennedy in November of 1963, however, his brother
lost both political power and his enthusiasm for the anti-racketeering
campaign,10 4 and the legislation died in committee. 05
Still, the spark had been lit. In 1965, President Johnson ap-
pointed a commission, headed by Attorney General Katzenbach to
study the organized crime problem.106 The Task Force concluded that
organized crime, with extensive operations in the fields of gambling,
loan sharking, and narcotics, as well as infiltration of legitimate busi-
ness and labor unions, posed a massive national problem 0 7 and rec-
ommended inter alia that Congress enact wiretapping and
eavesdropping legislation. This report, combined with the Supreme
Court's decision in Berger v. New York' 08 and the support of the FBI
and the Internal Revenue Service, led Congress to introduce a resur-
rection of the Justice Department's 1962 wiretapping bill. Also intro-
duced at the same time was a bill that allowed both wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping by federal and state authorities in certain
cases.' 09 After considerable manipulation on the part of its sponsors
the bill was enacted,"i 0 five years after it had originally been pro-
posed by the Justice Department.
The wisdom and the constitutionality of the wiretapping laws
has been amply debated"' and litigated.112With the enactment of
103. Id.at 80.
104. See V. NAVASKY, Kennedy Justice 51-52 (1971).
105. A vote was never held in committee. 109 CONG. REC. PROCEEDINGS DEBATES
OF THE 88TH Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) and 110 CONG. REC. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES
OF THE 88TH CONG., 2d Sess. (1964). Despite the absence of statutory authority, the
FBI used wiretapping extensively anyway. V. Navasky, supra n.103 at 66-67.
106. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 103, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 4
(1965).
107. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 2-4 (1967).
108. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger, the Court struck down a state conviction based
on electronic eavesdropping evidence which was obtained pursuant to a statute which
did not require a showing of probable cause or particularity for the authorities to
obtain an eavesdropping order from the court. Id. at 55.
109. Bills Relating to Crime Syndicates, Wiretapping, Admissibility in Evidence of
Confessions, Assisting State and Local Governments in Combating Crime and Related
Areas of Criminal Law and Procedures Before the Subcomm. On Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1005 (1967).
110. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (Title III is codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520).
111. See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
(1976) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL WIRETAP COMMISSION].
112. See, e.g.. United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973) (upholding con-
stitutionality of Title III despite earlier holding of unconstitutionality by district court
in same circuit), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Whitaker, 343 F.
Supp 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 1246, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973);
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (holding that "na-
tional security" wiretaps must conform to fourth amendment warrant requirements
(though 18 U.S.C § 2511(2)(e)-(f) had specified that Act was not intended to limit or
2006] 683
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
these bills, the national fear of organized crime had placed by far the
most powerful tool yet in the hands of law enforcement authorities
and, as in the past, that tool was not limited to use in organized crime
investigations. However, the requirements that the Attorney Gen-
eral or a designated Assistant Attorney General must approve the
tap or eavesdrop and that the judge must find that "normal investiga-
tive procedures have been tried and have failed" (or are likely to
fail)113 may serve to curb investigative zeal.114
A further legislative development in 1968 that established yet
another new jurisdictional beachhead for the federal government was
the extortionate credit transactions (loan-sharking) provision, Title II
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968.115 As originally intro-
duced, the Consumer Credit Protection bills contained no provisions
relating to loan-sharking.116 The provisions were inserted at the in-
stigation of Congressmen Poff of Virginia and McDade of Penn-
sylvania with the "cooperation" of the Justice Department.117
Because this Act incorporated a congressional finding that all loan-
sharking transactions affected interstate commerce, the statute did
not require that a particular transaction specifically involve inter-
state commerce at all." 8s The only information that could conceivably
justify this blanket conclusion of an effect on interstate commerce is
the finding that "organized crime takes $350 million a year from
America's poor through loan-sharking alone."" 9 It was this finding
as well as congressional discussion of a New York Times article (dis-
cussing how loan-sharking is used to "launder" organized crime's ill-
gotten gains)120 which led the Supreme Court in Perez v. United
States to uphold the statute against a challenge based on the Com-
merce Clause.121 This conclusion, however, is highly questionable in
many cases. It ignores that fact that loan-sharking can be, and usu-
define President's traditional power to wiretap in order to prevent overthrow of gov-
ernment)); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516(1) limits power to authorize wiretap applications to Attorney General or any
Assistant Attorney General he might designate); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S.
505 (1974) (same).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1982) & § 2518(3)(c) (1982).
114. According to the National Wiretap Commission, supra note 108, at 266, a total
of 4334 wiretaps (957 federal and 3377 state) were conducted between 1968 and 1974.
115. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pun. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146. (Title II is
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 891-96 (1982))
116. See S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 2550 (1968), later enacted as
Consumer Credit Protection Act, PuB. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146. (Title II is codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1982)).
117. See 114 CONG. REc. 14391 (1968) (remarks of Congressmen Poff and McDade).
118. Consumer Credit Protection Act, supra note 111, Title II § 201(a) (emphasis
added).
119. 114 Cong. Rec. 14391 (1968) (remarks of Congressman McDade).
120. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1968, § VI, at 19, reprinted in 114 CONG. REc. 1428-31
(1968).
121. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 (1971).
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ally is, a very mobile, individual operation.122 There was no indica-
tion in Congress as to why the government should be excused from
proving the jurisdictional element in each loan-sharking case, just as
it had to do in cases under all previously enacted statutes. The true
consideration behind this, though it does not appear in the legislative
history, is that in any given case it is virtually impossible to prove
any effect on interstate commerce because no meaningful impact ac-
tually exists.
As with past expansions of federal authority, in the case of loan-
sharking the need for federal legislation was due to the states' lack of
will to enforce their extortion laws, not their lack of jurisdictional au-
thority. But this legislation differs from past legislation in that the
peculiarly local nature of loan-sharking led to a statute where the
interstate connection need not (because it generally could not) be
proven. The decision in Perez culminated the trend begun by Cham-
pion v. Amesl 23 of expanding the federal police power to its limit. Re-
cent Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Lopezl 24 and United
States v. Morrison' 25 seemed to indicate that the Court was ready to
curb Congress's power in this area. While citing Perez with approval,
both cases overturned federal criminal statutes and limited federal
jurisdiction under the commerce clause to regulation of "commercial
activity" and the "channels and instrumentalities of commerce." De-
spite this ostensible limitation, no federal organized crime statutes
have been struck down by application of the reasoning in Morrison or
Lopez.126 Furthermore, the Court's recent decision in the "medical
marijuana" case Gonzalez v. Raich,127 put to rest any doubts about
the continuing viability of Perez and suggested that the Court will not
seriously interfere with the expansion of federal police power under
the commerce clause when it is packaged as part of the fight against
the scourges of organized crime, narcotics or terrorism.
V. THE PRESENT. . . AND THE FUTURE
Despite the accumulation of federal power since the Lottery Act,
the Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division) candidly admit-
ted before a House committee in 1968 that there was "no way of gaug-
122. Impact of Crime on Small Business, 1968: Hearings before the Select Commit-
tee on Small Business, United States Senate, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1968). (testimony
of Ralph Salerno). Salerno testified that federal legislation was needed because loan
sharks, unlike gamblers, were hard to catch as a result of their lack of organization.
123. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
124. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
125. United States v. Lopez,, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
126. See, C. Bradley, Federalism and Federal Criminal Law, 55 Hastings L. J. 573,
581(2004) for a discussion of the (non) impact of these cases on federal criminal law
enforcement.
127. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
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ing" whether organized crime was increasing or decreasing.128 The
committee concluded that, although the government possesses a
"wealth of weapons" to fight organized crime1 29 the efforts to cut the
growth of organized crime had failed due, not to the lack of legislative
authority but to the lack of coordination among the many agencies
with responsibilities in the area. 30
In November of 1968, Richard Nixon was elected to the Presi-
dency in a campaign that emphasized "law and order" after public
fear of crime and disorder had been stirred by summer riots in the
country's black ghettos. While there was no reason to directly associ-
ate this problem with organized crime, the Justice Department be-
lieved that the time was ripe for obtaining additional legislative
authority from Congress. Shortly after his inauguration, the Presi-
dent ordered the Attorney General to engage in wiretapping of organ-
ized racketeers,' 3 asked Congress to double (up to $61 million) the
amount spent in fighting organized crime, and proposed new legisla-
tion which would give the Justice Department immunity power,
amend the wagering, tax statutes, make local corruption a federal
crime, cut off gambling income, and prevent the infiltration of legiti-
mate businesses by organized crime. 3 2
This proposal represented a presidential imprimatur on legisla-
tion already introduced on January 15, 1969 by Senator McClel-
lan.133 This bill (S. 30) contained eight titles pertinent to the problem
of organized crime. Title I provided for special grand juries to investi-
gate organized crime.'34 Title II was an immunity statute giving the
Justice Department the power to immunize witnesses in the investi-
gation of any federal crime.'35 Title III provided for confinement,
without bail (for as long as the grand jury was in session) of any wit-
ness who refused to testify before a federal grand jury "without just
cause."13 6 Title IV provided penalties for false statement before the
grand jury.'37 Title V provided for the taking of depositions and the
use of such depositions at trial if the witness was unavailable. 38 Ti-
128. FEDERAL EFFORT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME: REPORT OF AGENCY OPERATIONS,
H.R REP No. 1574, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 29 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL.
EFFORT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME].
129. Id. at 75.
130. Id.
131. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO THE FIGHT
AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME, H.R. Doc. No. 105, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969).
132. Id. at 5-6.
133. S. 30, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 829-32 (1969).
134. S. 30,§§ 101-105 (1969). Id. at 829-30 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-
3334).
135. S. 30, §§ 201-202 (1969). Id. at 830 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-
6005). As such, the immunity statute was far broader than any previously proposed.
136. S. 30, § 301 (1969). Id. at 830 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1826).
137. S. 30, § 401 (1969). Id. at 830 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1623).
138. S. 30, § 501 (1969). Id. at 830 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3503). As en-
acted, this procedure is now available to any party.
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tie VI provided protected facilities for housing government wit-
nesses.139 Title VII provided for the admissibility of the statements of
coconspirators in federal trials. 140 Title VIII provided for enhanced
sentences for "dangerous special offenders." 1 4 1
The bills survived extensive hearings at which the Attorney Gen-
eral offered the usual observations: "Organized crime poses a serious
threat to our form of government and our system of criminal justice,
but "I am happy to report that we have made significant progress on
many fronts."142 They were adopted with numerous although rela-
tively minor changes.' 43 Bills prohibiting "gambling businesses"144
and mob infiltration into legitimate business (RICO)' 45 were also in-
corporated into S. 30 and passed by an overwhelming vote.146
The Act provided another tremendous boost to the federal law
enforcement effort, particularly the two new substantive crimes
under RICO147 and the gambling business prohibition.14 8 Moreover,
the government's ability to conduct grand jury investigations in or-
ganized crime and public corruption cases was greatly enhanced by
the immunity, contempt, and witness protection statutes. As before,
these broad statutes aimed at organized crime have been used in all
139. S. 30, § 601 (1969). Id. at 831 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3481).
140. S. 30, § 701 (1969). Id. at 831. This title was amended to become the current
18 U.S.C. § 3504).
141. S. 30, § 801 (1969). Id. at 831-32 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-78).
This became Title X of the final Act. S. 30 also contained a Title IX which provided
that if any portion of the Act was held invalid, the other portions would not be af-
fected. Id. at 832.
142. Organized Crime Control: Hearings before Subcomm. No, 5 of the Comm. On
the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 153 (1970).
143. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 365-77(1969) (Department of Justice Comments on S. 30) [here-
inafter referred to as Hearings on Measures].
144. See S. 2022 in Hearings on Measures, Id, at 83.
145. See S. 1623 and S. 1861 in Hearings on Measures, Id., at 37 & 61. See C.
Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO. 65 IowA L. REV.
837 (1980) (discussing more fully legislative history of this particularly significant
provision) [hereinafter cited as Bradley].
146. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 937
(1970).The Senate vote was 73 to 1. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its
Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 55 (1970).
147. RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968, prohibits the acquisition of any enterprise through the investment of racketeer-
ing proceeds, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), as well as the acquisition or operation of an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activities, 18 U.S.C. § 962(b) (c). In addition
to a 20 year sentence for the violation of any of the RICO subsections, the statute also
provides for forfeiture of the "racketeers'" interest in the enterprise, 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(1982). See Bradley, supra note 143, for a detailed analysis of the criminal provisions
of RICO. RICO also provides for civil remedies for RICO violations. 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud in Context: Reflections on Bennet v. Berg, 58 No-
TRE DAME LAw. 237 (1982).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 makes the conducting, managing, or general operating of a
gambling business (involving five or more persons) a federal crime without requiring
any impact on interstate commerce.
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manner of cases, most of which have nothing to do with the problem
of organized crime. RICO, originally aimed at stopping infiltration of
organized crime into legitimate business, has been used to prosecute
defendants who committed three robberies, 1 4 9 a defendant who de-
frauded Medicare through his hospital supply business,150 and a
group which operated a "weekend dice and card game" in a trailer
park.15 ' RICO has virtually never been used in a case which was not
reachable by other statutes, and has been used much more exten-
sively as a tool for civil litigation than for criminal prosecution of
racketeers. In all these cases, the courts have upheld federal jurisdic-
tion, sometimes exhibiting the same patriotic zeal displayed years
before in Champion v. Ames.152
At the same time, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, providing for severe pen-
alties for certain drug violations. In the case of a "continuing series of
violations" of federal drug laws, undertaken by a person who holds a
position of authority over at least five other people, a first violation
can result in 20 years imprisonment and a fine of $2,000,000. The
statute also authorizes life imprisonment in the case of a violator who
is the leader of a large scale drug organization.15 3
Despite this possibly unnecessary expansion of the federal gov-
ernment's powers, there is no evidence that it has been used other
than to prosecute genuinely criminal behavior. This was not true of
the Justice Department's use of the broad new powers conferred by
the immunity statute which, by authorizing immunization from pros-
ecution, allowed the government to coerce grand jury testimony by
neutralizing Fifth Amendment claims.15 4 This power carries great
potential for harassment and intimidation of people whom the gov-
ernment does not like. For example, the Nixon administration used
the new powers to persecute anti-war and anti-Nixon protesters.' 5 5
Given the vast new powers provided by the 1970 Act, the broad
view the Justice Department was taking of these powers, and the
149. United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
946 (1980).
150. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1980).
151. United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
951 (1978).
152. E.g. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978). Circuit Judge
Simpson stated that, "In this case we deal with the question of whether and, if so, how
a free society can protect itself when groups of people, through division of labor, spe-
cialization, diversification, complexity of organization and the accumulation of capi-
tal, turn crime into an ongoing business." Id at 884.
153. 21 U.S.C. § 848, 84 Stat. 1236.
154. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
155. Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 46, H.R. 1277 and Related Bills: Federal Grand Jury
before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizen-
ship and International Law, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 213 (1976)
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permissive attitude of the courts, it would have seemed that the fed-
eral army would at last have been prepared to smite the enemy a
deadly blow. Of course, that did not happen. A 1977 study by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) entitled WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME
FALTERING attributed the failure of the government to make signifi-
cant inroads to three principal factors: 1) consumer demand for or-
ganized crime's goods and services provide it with billions of dollars
each year; 2) federal work against organized crime is not planned,
organized or directed efficiently; and, 3) most convictions obtained by
strike forces have resulted in no prison sentences or sentences of less
than two years. 156 Equally important, the GAO found that "[tihere is
no agreement on what organized crime is and, consequently, on pre-
cisely whom or what the Government is fighting."' 57
As to the first point, certainly a major reason for the failure of
the law enforcement effort against organized crime is that people do
not really want it to succeed. A strenuous law enforcement crack-
down might drive up the price of gambling, prostitution or narcotics,
but it is inconceivable that these sources of organized crime income
could be eliminated unless demand disappears. However, this is not
necessarily true of such organized criminal activities as labor racke-
teering and the "protection" racket which are crimes with victims and
consequently more amenable to elimination.
The second point, lack of coordination of the federal effort, re-
flects the age old conflicts between bureaucratic agencies struggling
for power - in this case, the FBI, the Organized Crime Section of the
Justice Department, the IRS, the DEA and other enforcement agen-
cies. To some extent this problem has been alleviated by Justice De-
partment efforts.' 5 8 The third point, few long prison sentences,
almost surely was indicative of the quality of the cases rather than
the leniency of the judges. There is a natural tendency to convict
somebody once an investigation has begun, even if the person is not a
significant figure.
The final point, lack of consistent definition of organized crime,
has enabled the Justice Department to portray the anti-organized
crime effort as either failing or succeeding depending on the Depart-
ment's purposes. Now, the definition of an "organized crime case" is
simply a case which is opened under a statute that the FBI considers
to be an "organized crime statute," such as ITAR or RICO. Conse-
156. REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME FALTERING - FEDERAL STRIKE FORCES NOT GET-
TING THE JOB DONE (1977).
157. Id at i (1981).
158. See REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, STRONGER
FEDERAL EFFORT NEEDED IN FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME 7-9 (1981) (follow-up to
1977 study finding various "management techniques" have "added to the effectiveness
of the program to fight organized crime").
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quently, many of the convictions in "organized crime cases" do not
involve organized crime personnel at all, but, as discussed previously,
"everyday" criminals who have fallen within the broad sweep of the
legislation.159
Despite the purported failure of Congress and law enforcement
in this area, or perhaps in part because of it, attention on the organ-
ized crime problem has significantly decreased over the last twenty
years. The most recent organized crime statute, the Continuing Fi-
nancial Crimes Enterprise Act, was passed in 1990.160
Although the government's advancement of the federalization of
crime has been by no means an entirely unfortunate development,
the monolithic character of the single Justice Department effort com-
pared to the more feeble attempts of the fifty states carries poten-
tially dangerous consequences. The Justice Department compiles the
statistics that define the problem, investigates and prosecutes the
cases, urges broad interpretation of statutory authority on the courts
and proposes new legislative authority to Congress. Yet, as was dis-
cussed, the only means the Justice Department has for measuring
"the problem" is by attempting to measure the number of investiga-
tions, indictments or convictions in "organized crime cases," which
are unhelpfully defined as cases opened under organized crime stat-
utes - the statutes discussed in this article. The flaw in this tech-
nique is immediately apparent: as the number of statutes increases,
the number of violations increases by definition. Thus, it is not incon-
sistent for the Justice Department to report ever greater success
against organized crime and at the same time complain that the
problem is growing. No one knows how much the number of criminals
has grown or shrunk because the definitions keep changing.
Whatever the actual numbers may be, this phenomenon will operate
to make it seem to be growing faster than it is.
What is at work is a complicated version of Parkinson's Law as to
a bureaucracy's tendency to perpetuate itself.161 The Justice Depart-
ment identifies a problem and presses Congress for more legislative
authority. More legislative authority naturally requires more man-
159. Telephone interview of FBI official by author, August 1983. As of 1976, the
Justice Department had a definition of organized crime but it was too vague to be of
use in compiling statistics: "Organized crime includes any group of individuals whose
primary activity involves violating criminal laws to seek illegal profits and power by
engaging in racketeering activities and, when appropriate, engaging in intricate fi-
nancial manipulations." NATIONAL ADvIsORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS AND GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME 213, app.
1(1976).
160. The CFCE provides for penalties of at least 10 years and as much as life in
prison for persons who commit a series of violations of other statutes, if such viola-
tions affect a financial institution. 18 U.S.C. § 225.
161. C. PARKINSON, PARKINSON's LAw (1957). Parkinson demonstrates that the
growth of a bureaucracy has no connection to the actual subject matter with which it
has to deal.
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power and funds, which are also approved. These new agents and
prosecutors zealously sally forth and make more cases against "rack-
eteers," i.e., people who violate the new statutes. And then it is dis-
covered, much to the consternation of all concerned, that there are
more racketeers than ever. The solution? More legislative authority.
This model remains accurate despite the current lack of public
attention to organized crime. During the past two decades, the fight
against organized crime has been replaced by the war on terror as
law enforcement's top priority.162 This tendency of a bureaucracy to
perpetuate itself is also evident within this framework. The Defense
Department and the newly created Department of Homeland Secur-
ity depend for their continued prosperity upon the public's perception
that a problem-the threat of the terrorism -is worse than ever, re-
gardless of what the truth may be.
But there is more to the organized crime phenomenon than sim-
ply a bureaucracy's tendency to expand. As noted, the early growth of
federal power in this area came from congressional initiative. In re-
cent years, the political appointees in the executive branch have led
the fight against organized crime, sometimes without the support of
the FBI bureaucracy. Congress, however, has been a highly coopera-
tive partner, as has the U.S. Supreme Court. This peculiar harmony
among the three branches of government is both unique and dis-
turbing, for it indicates that the traditional system of checks and bal-
ances has broken down. This might not be troublesome if the result
had been the eradication of organized crime. But, in light of the fact
that organized crime has not been eradicated and that the federal
power thus acquired is not used primarily against organized crime
figures, has this great build-up of federal power been appropriate?
In the future, Justice Department descriptions of the scope of the
problem and the need for new authority should be treated with con-
siderably more skepticism than they have been in the past. The natu-
ral tendency of the Justice Department bureaucracy to increase and
multiply in both size and power must be factored into any future deci-
sions concerning legislation or funding.
When Congress does agree to draft organized crime legislation,
the statutes should be narrowly drawn to focus directly on the prob-
lem rather than depending on prosecutors to impose limits on them-
selves. In fact, in the author's view, the Department has more than
ample legislative authority, and Congress should consider scaling
back this authority somewhat; for example, by narrowing the scope of
RICO to cases that really do involve organized criminals or, if this
cannot be done, by abolishing RICO altogether. Similarly, wiretap-
ping authority, the most intrusive of all current federal powers,
162. At www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/10/bush.kerry.terror/index.html
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should be limited, as was originally proposed, to investigations of
only the most serious violations, rather than to virtually all cases, as
was finally enacted. Finally, Congress should recognize that just as
changing circumstances may require the granting of new powers, so
too should consideration be given to the curtailing of old powers
which are no longer needed or were unwisely granted in the first
place. To date, no grant of statutory authority to the Justice Depart-
ment in the racketeering area has ever been revoked or limited.
This article has demonstrated the ability of the federal govern-
ment to greatly expand its power to deal with a threat which, though
it excites the popular imagination, is not as grave or as immediate as
other threats that could readily be imagined. As mentioned, this abil-
ity to expand federal power also exists in other areas. 163 If the organ-
ized crime experience is a reliable model, it is likely that greater
concentration of power in the hands of the Justice Department and
the Department of Homeland Security, and the commensurate reduc-
tions in civil liberties, will continue. In the future, it must be recog-
nized that the DOJ and DHS's assessments and the statistics they
will present to support it are colored by the assumption that the best
way to deal with any law enforcement problem is to give more power
to the federal law enforcement authorities. Blind acceptance of this
assumption by the Congress and public, as has repeatedly occurred in
the past, would be a mistake.
163. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. CT. 981 (2004) (discussing the question of whether
the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as "enemy combatants",
and what process is "constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combat-
ant status"). See also U.S.A. Patriot Act, Title II. (Enhanced Surveillance
Procedures).
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